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Faculty and Deans

The Politics of "Advice and Consent"
by William F. Swindler

Counting the rejections of Judges
Haynsworth and Carswell, there
are now twenty-three nominations
to the Supreme Court that have
been defeated or postponed by the
Senate or withdrawn by the President
in the face of defeat. The Senate
is jealous of its "advice and
consent" function, and history
shows that confirmation will be
withheld for a variety of reasons.
The process of confirmation or
rejection by the Senate is a part of
the American political systemunavoidably, perennially and,
perhaps, logically.

W ITH
THE SENATE'S rejection of
Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., last
November and G. Harrold Carswell
last April, the number of unsuccessful
Presidential nominations for the Supreme Court of the United States over
our 180 years of judicial history now
stands at twenty-six. Of this total,
eleven were rejected by a recorded vote
and seven were withdrawn by the White
House when it became clear they
would not be approved. As to the other
eight, the Senate either took no action
or noted that action was to be "postponed" indefinitely. 1 (See the tabulation on page 536.)
What these statistics tell about the
interrelationships between the legislative and executive branches of the government may be estimated best by reviewing the contemporary circumstances of the nominations. Most of the
cases of declined appointments, coming
in the early days of the Republic, reflected a denigration of the Court itself
as a career opportunity for successful
lawyers or politicians. Most of the rejections of nominees, it is apparent,
were incidents to a series of party
struggles, as in the case of the fierce
contest between Grover Cleveland and
Senator David Hill for control of the
New York Democratic machine in the
1880s, or in the case of John Tyler, rejected by his own Whig Party in the
bitter political divisions of 1844. A relative minority of the unsuccessful nominations turned on the merits of the individual nominees.
It may be argued that a distinction
between the rejections of the nineteenth century and the four to date in
the twentieth century may be made on
a basis of ideologies. The cases from
Washington's day through the second
administration of Grover Cleveland
were, almost without exception, by-

products of a political antipathy between the Senate and the White House.
But the rejection of President Hoover's
nomination of John J. Parker in 1930,
the filibuster against Lyndon Johnson's
proposal of Justice Fortas to succeed
Chief Justice Warren and the two Senate rejections of President Nixon's
nominees were prompted, with an increasing degree of recognition of the
fact, by the Senate's hostility to what is
purported to be the constitutional philosophy of the candidates. Fortas's opposition couched its arguments in
terms of "cronyism", but it was fairly
evident that the root of the matter was
his identification with broad and permissive doctrines on defendants' rights.
Parker, Haynsworth and Carswell were
opposed candidly for their basic convictions on socioeconomic issues of the
day.
Partisanship and Politics
Are Always Involved
The elements of partisanship or political consideration in the selection of
judicial appointees have been present
in cases of confirmation as often as in
cases of rejection. "I observe that old
Cushing is dead", wrote Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin in 1810 when
Associate Justice William Cushing
passed from the scene. "At length,
then, we have a chance of getting a Republican [i. e., Democratic] majority
in the Supreme Judiciary." 2 James
Polk, writing to Martin Van Buren in
1837, observed with satisfaction that
"with Judges Catron and McKinley on

1. Six others were approved by the Senate
but refused to accept the appointments, while
a seventh-Abraham Lincoln's Secretary of
War, Edwin M. Stanton-was confirmed but
died before he could he commissioned and
sworn in.

2. Quoted in 1 BouDiN, GOVERNMENT BY
JuDIcAaY 536 (1932).
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the bench, the Court will be strong,
and will have a decided Democratic
bias". 3 In 1902 Theodore Roosevelt
commented to Henry Cabot Lodge: "In
the ordinary and low sense which we
attach to the words 'partisan' and 'politician,' a judge of the Supreme Court
should be neither. But in the higher
sense, in the proper sense, he is not in
my judgment fitted for the position unless he is a party man, a constructive
statesman." 4 Roosevelt, incidentally,
was referring to Oliver Wendell
Holmes, a prospective nominee.
The politics of "advice and consent", manifest in many confirmations
as well as most rejections of Supreme
Court nominees, is perhaps endemic in
the process set out in Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution.5 "The Senate cannot originate an appointment.
Its constitutional action is confined to
the simple affirmation or rejection of
the President's nominations, and such
nominations fail whenever it rejects
them", stated an early nineteenth century opinion of the Attorney General.
"The Senate may suggest conditions
and limitations to the President, but it
cannot vary those submitted by him,
for no appointment can be made except on his nomination, agreed to with'6
out qualifications or alteration."
In the course of his struggle for
Judge Carswell's confirmation, President Nixon wrote a manifestly ill-advised and ill-informed letter to Senator
William B. Saxbe of Ohio, in which he
complained that failure of the Senate
to "advise and consent" to the nomination amounted to denying the Chief
Executive the right "accorded all previous Presidents" to place men of his
choice on the bench. Not only is this
contradicted by history, but it suggests
that the Senate's ratification should be
little more than pro forma, and it confesses what traditionally has been left
unsaid-that ideological and political
factors are elements in the Presidential
selections.

"Advice and Consent" Is
an Essential Middle Step
The views of both Kent and Story
were that "advice and consent" made
the Senate's action an essential func-
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tion of the constitutional process of appointment-the middle step between
Presidential nomination and Presidential commission. 7 The realities of the
process in operation have not borne
out Alexander Hamilton's optimistic
assumption:
It will be the office of the president
to nominate, and with the advice and
consent of the senate to appoint. There
will of course be no exertion of choice
on the part of the senate. They may
defeat one choice of the executive, and
oblige him to make another; but they
cannot themselves choose--they can
only ratify or reject the choice, of the
president. They might even entertain a
preference to some other person, at the
very moment they were assenting to
the one proposed; because there might
be no positive ground of opposition to
him; and they could not be sure, if
they withhold their assent, that the
subsequent nomination would fall upon
their favorite, or upon any other person in their estimation more meritorious than the one rejected. Thus it
could hardly happen that the majority
of the senate would feel any other
complacency towards the object of an
appointment, than such, as the appearances of merit, might inspire, and the
proofs of the want of it, destroy. 8

Senate Prepares To Vote
Down for the First Time
The Olympian detachment with
which Hamilton assumed (or affected
to assume) that the Senate would ratify or reject Presidential nominations
was dispelled within six years after the
Constitution went into operation. Hamilton himself wrote of the nominee for
the Chief Justiceship in 1795 that "if it
be really true . . . that he has exposed
himself by improper conduct in pecuniary transactions", he should be rejected, while a leading New Jersey attorney added that the nominee's "insensitivity" in certain public issues
made it clear that he "ought not to preside in the highest judicial Court of
the Nation". 9 In these high-sounding
phrases with a strangely contemporary
accent, the Senate was preparing for
the first time to vote down a Supreme
Court nomination.
John Rutledge-like Clement Haynsworth, a South Carolinian-was in
1789 George Washington's second appointment to the Supreme Court. He
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had served as an Associate Justice for
eighteen months and then resigned.
But when Chief Justice John Jay resigned four years later, Rutledge lost
no time in writing to Washington that
he would "have no objection to take
the place which [Jayl holds". Rutledge's letter makes clear that he felt
that the Chief's chair was the one he
should have had in the first place,
since "many of my friends were displeased at my accepting the office of
Associate Judge, . . . conceiving (as I
thought, very justly) that my pretensions to the office of Chief Justice were
at least equal to Mr. Jay's in point of
law-knowledge, with the additional
weight of much longer experience and
1
much greater practice".
Self-seeking and self-adulating as
Rutledge's words may sound, it had
been rather generally recognized in
1789, when Washington was choosing
the first candidates for the new Supreme Court, that fundamentally political considerations were involved. John
Adams himself had advised: "If ability
is desired, take Rutledge; if politics,
Jay." Washington knew precisely what
he wanted; he not only took Jay for
his first Chief Justice, but he saw to it
that every one of his appointments was
a good Federalist. Now, perhaps to
make amends, he hastened to accede to
Rutledge's suggestion and grant him a
recess appointment, directing that the
Secretary of State prepare his commission forthwith.
Having taken the first and third
steps in the appointing process, Washington placed himself in a position of
depending utterly upon the Senate to
take the indispensable middle step. The
President should have recalled the

3. Id. at 109.
4. 1 SELECTIONS

FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HENRY

CABOT LODGE, 1884-1918, 517 (1925).
by

5. The President "shall ... nominate and,
and with the advice and consent of the

Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the
Supreme Court".
6. 3 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 188 (1837).
7. 1 KENT, COMMENTARIES 310 (1826) ; 2
STORY, COMMENTARIES § 1539 (1833).
8. T E FEDERALIST No. 66, at 449-450
(Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
9. 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 137 (1922).

10. Id. at 127.
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awkward situation into which he had
gotten himself two years earlier, when
he had proposed New Jersey's William
Paterson for an Associate Justiceship.
Paterson's name was submitted on February 27, 1793, while he was still a
member of the United States Senate.
He had been elected to the First Congress in 1789 and had participated in
the legislation creating the Supreme
Court and fixing the number of Justices.
Thus, under the terms of Article I,
Section 6, of the Constitution" Paterson was ineligible to receive the appointment while his current term in the
Senate was running. The President had
to mark time. Paterson fell into the
second class of Senators in the beginning of Congress, whose terms expired
at the end of four years. A week later,
on March 4, 1793, Washington resubmitted Paterson's name and the Senate
confirmed the same day.

Rutledge Condemns Treaty
and Is Condemned
The Paterson problem was a technicality that was readily remedied; the
Rutledge matter was something else. It
appeared that, after receiving Washington's advice of his nomination and
perhaps after receiving his commission
from the Secretary of State, Rutledge
had delivered himself of a vehement
speech condemning the treaty just
signed between Great Britain and the
United States. Jay's Treaty, making
some concessions to Great Britain as a
means of relieving the mounting pressure of animosities between the two nations, outraged many Americans when
its contents became known. Anti-Federalists, who were beginning to call
themselves, somewhat self-consciously,
by the radical label of Democratic Republicans, denounced the treaty as an
affront to the French, their onetime
ally in the struggle for independence.
Federalists, while not generally enthusiastic about the treaty, tended to close
ranks and regard any criticism as a betrayal of loyalty to the administration.
In this atmosphere, a speech by a man
just advanced to the nation's highest
judicial post by the administration,
and himself at least nominally a Feder-

alist, stunned the administration followers in the Senate.
As if to compound the charges of his
"insensitivity", Rutledge proceeded to
Philadelphia amid the furor over his
speech, took the oath as Chief Justice
and formally opened the August, 1795,
term of the Court. Although there were
only a couple of cases on the docket, a
whispering campaign of vilification
was in full progress, suggesting that
only a demented man would have acted
as Rutledge had in recent months and
adding dark hints that he ought to
answer for vaguely described financial
imbroglios as well. It was enough to
set the stage for a swift and stern Federalist retribution when Congress
opened in December of that year.
The lineup on the Rutledge vote is of
some interest. Of the thirty-two senators in 1795, nineteen were Federalists
and thirteen Anti-Federalists, or Democratic Republicans. On the vote, twenty-four senators were counted; the remaining eight adopted the not uncommon tactic of being conveniently absent on the occasion, all of them being
administration party men who preferred not to be on record as opposing
their own President's nomination. Of
the ten who voted for confirmation,
only three were Federalists; of the nineteen who voted to reject, only one was
an Anti-Federalist and thirteen were
12
Federalists.
In 1811, when Jefferson was rejoicing at the prospect of getting a Democratic-Republican majority on the
bench as a consequence of Cushing's
death, President James Madison encountered his own difficulties with the
Senate and its prerogative to "advise
and consent". The assumption was that
a choice would be made from Cushing's old circuit, which lay in strongly
Federalist New England; to select an
Anti-Federalist from that area would
require a good deal of political adroitness.
Levi Lincoln of Massachusetts, Jefferson's Attorney General from 1801 to
1804, first was nominated by Madison
and confirmed by the Senate, but he declined the position because of his failing health. Madison's objective had
been clear-to find a vigorous Jeffer-

Thomas L. WilltIom
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sonian to counterbalance Marshall on
the bench-and the Jeffersonian majority in the Senate had acquiesced.
But the President's alternative nomination, Alexander Wolcott of Connecticut, "excited the astonishment of even
Democrats", as one of them confessed.
The fervor of Wolcott's partisanshiphe was the political boss of his stateappeared to be the strongest qualification he could offer. Levi Lincoln himself rather lamely wrote that whatever
might be Wolcott's professional record
to date, he believed that "an industrious application to professional studies and official duties" might soon put
the new nominee "on a level at least"
with his associates. But even a Jeffersonian Senate could not swallow so me1t. "No Senator or Representative shall,
during the time for which he was elected,
be appointed to any civil
office under the
authority of the United States, which shall
have

been

created,

or

the

emoluments

whereof shall have been increased during
such time ...."
12. S. ExEc. Joua., December 15, 1795.
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Supreme Court Nominations Rejected or Refused
In the following tabulation, details on the nominations to the
Supreme Court of the United States which were declined by
the nominees or acted on adversely by the Senate have been
summarized. The political composition of the Senate at the time
President and
Supreme Court Nominee
George Washington
Robert H. Harrison
William Paterson'
John Rutledge, C.J.2
William Cushing, C.J.
John Adams
John Jay, C.J.
James Madison
Levi Lincoln
Alexander Wolcott
John Q. Adams
John Q. Adams
John J. Crittenden
Andrew Jackson
Roger B. Taney 3
William Smith
John Tyler
John C. Spencer
Reuben H. Walworth
Edward King
John M. Read
James K. Polk
George W. Woodward
Millard Fillmore
Edward A. Bradford
George E. Badger
William C. Micou
James Buchanan
Jeremiah S. Black
Andrew Johnson
Henry Stanbery
Ulysses S. Grant
Ebenezer R. Hoar
Edwin M. Stanton

of such action is shown by major parties only: F.-Federalist;
A.-F,-Anti-Federalist; D. R.-Democratic Republican; N. R.National Republican; W.-Whig; D.-Democratic; R.-Republican.

Senate
Composition

Date of
Nomination

Action on
Nomination

Nature of
Action

F. 17; A.-F. 9
F. 17; A.-F. 13
F. 19; A,-F. 13

Sept. 26, 1789
Feb. 28, 1793
Dec. 15, 1795

confirmed; declined
withdrawn
rejected, 10-14

F. 19; A.-F. 13

Sept. 24, 1789
Feb. 27, 1793
July 1, 1795
Nov. 5, 1795
Jan. 26, 1796

Jan. 27, 1796

confirmed; declined

F. 19; D.R. 13

Dec. 18, 1800

Dec. 19, 1800

confirmed; declined

D R. 28; F. 6
D.R. 28; F. 6
D.R. 28; F. 6

Jan. 2, 1811
Feb. 4, 1811
Feb. 21, 1811

Jan. 13, 1811
Feb. 13, 1811
Feb. 22, 1811

confirmed; declined
rejected, 9-24
confirmed; declined

D.R. 28; N.R. 20

Dec. 17, 1828

Feb. 12, 1829

"postponed"

D. 20; W. 20
D. 30; W. 18

Jan. 15, 1835
March 3, 1837

March 3, 1835
March 8, 1837

"postponed", 24-21
confirmed; declined

W. 28; D. 25
W. 28; D. 25

Jan. 9, 1844
March 13, 1844

W. 28; D. 25
W. 28; D. 25

June 5, 1844
Dec. 4, 1844
Feb. 7, 1845

Jan. 31, 1844
Jan. 15, 1845
Jan. 27, 1845
Jan. 15, 1845
Feb. 7,1845

rejected, 21-26
"postponed"
withdrawn
"postponed"
withdrawn
no action

D. 31; W. 25

Dec. 23, 1845

Jan. 22, 1846

rejected, 20-29

D. 35; W. 24
D. 35; W. 24
D. 35; W. 24

Aug. 16, 1852
Jan. 10, 1853
Feb. 24, 1853

Feb. 11, 1853

no action
"postponed"

D. 36; R. 26

Feb. 5,1861

Feb. 21, 1861

R. 36; D. 26

April 16, 1866

R. 56; D. 11
R. 56; D. 11

Dec. 15, 1869
Dec. 20, 1869

no action
rejected, 25-26
no action
Feb. 3,1870
Dec. 20, 1869

rejected, 46-11
confirmed (d. Dec. 24,
1869)
withdrawn
withdrawn

Jan. 8, 1874
Dec. 1. 1873
George H. Williams, C.J.
R. 49; D. 19
Caleb Cushing, C.J.
Jan. 10, 1874
Jan. 13, 1874
R. 49; D. 19
Rutherford B. Hayes
no action
Stanley Matthews4
Jan. 26, 1881
D. 42; R. 33
Chester A. Arthur
confirmed; declined
Roscoe Conkling
Feb. 24, 1882
March 2, 1882
R. 37; D. 37
Grover Cleveland
rejected, 24-30
William B. Hornblower
D. 44; R. 38
Sept. 17, 1893
Jan. 15, 1894
Wheeler H. Peckham
Feb. 16, 1894
rejected, 32-41
Jan. 22, 1893
D. 44; R. 38
Herbert Hoover
John J. Parker
May 5, 1930
R. 56; D. 39
March 21, 1930
rejected, 39-41
Lyndon B.Johnson
Abe Fortas, C.J.
D. 64; R. 36
June 27, 1968
Oct. 7, 1968
withdrawn
5
Homer Thornberry
Oct. 7, 1968
D. 64; R. 36
June 27, 1968
withdrawn
Richard M. Nixon
D. 58; R. 42
Sept. 4, 1969
Nov. 21, 1969
rejected, 45-55
Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.
D. 58; R. 42
Jan. 19. 1970
Aeril 7. 1970
rejected. 45-51
G. Harrold Carswell
Paterson's name was inadvertantly submitted before his term as Senator had expired, he having been a member of the Senate
which created the Court positions under the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
2 Rutledge was commissioned, sworn in and presided over the August, 1795, Term of the Court.
. The Senate rejected the nomination as an attempt to control the Court through Taney's Cabinet affiliation. In the 1836 election,
with six additional states voting, the Democrats won control of the Senate. Taney was renominated, this time for Chief Justice,
and was confirmed, 29-15.
4 The nomination, caught between Democratic control of the Senate and Senator Conkling's fight with Hayes, was pigeonholed.
In the new Senate, Democrats and Republicans were evenly divided. Garfield promptly resubmitted Matthew's name, and he
was confirmed, 24-23.
5 The Senate never reached this nomination, as it was tied to the effort to advance Fortas to Chief Justice.
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diocre a nominee, and lie was voted
down, 9 to 24.13
Madison, having been rebuffed by
too patent a political choice, then hit
upon a candidate popular with everyone--John Quincy Adams, at the moment minister to Russia. Although confirmed, Adams also declined the position, confessing that he felt out of
touch with the law and in any case was
more interested in active politics. More
or less by default, the position finally
went to a New Englander who seemed
at the time to be decidedly of secondlevel ability and little promise of intellectual perception in matters of constitutional law. His name was Joseph
Story.

Outgoing Presidents Have
Trouble Making Nominations
John Quincy Adams, as President,
had troubles of his own with an attempted Supreme Court appointment
in December, 1828. Andrew Jackson
had won the Presidential election that
fall, and the Democrat-dominated Senate insisted that the choice to fill the
existing vacancy should be left to the
incoming executive. This argument,
made as recently as in the nomination
of Justice Fortas for the Chief Justiceship in the summer of 1968, was to become a familiar one throughout the
nineteenth century. Politically inspired
charges and countercharges rang
through press and Congress. Adams,
on the urging of Henry Clay, nominated John J. Crittenden, an outspoken
Whig and former Senator from Kentucky. The Senate, dominated by Jackson men, loudly decried the attempt of
the Clay forces to place "one of his
14
men on the Supreme Bench for life".
Although the Crittenden nomination
had been sent to the Senate on December 18, it was not until February 12 of
the following year that the Judiciary
Committee reported to the Senate floor
a resolution that "it is not expedient to
act upon the nomination . . . during
15
the present session of Congress".
Within a few weeks, Andrew Jackson
would take the oath of office as President, and the issue would be dead without the formality of a Senate rejection.
Like Adams, other outgoing Presi-

dents have been frustrated in efforts to
place their candidates on the Court on
the eve of their own departure from office. Jackson himself-although apparently with Martin Van Buren's acquiescence-on March 3, 1837, nominated
William Smith of South Carolina,
along with John Catron of Tennessee,
for two vacancies on the bench. Both
men were confirmed, but Smith declined with what a Court historian
calls "a public statement of refreshing
frankness". Smith, a onetime United
States Senator, confessed that he preferred the active political life or at
least freedom to discuss political issues
from public platforms, and be added
that while he "believed that a judge
was not bound by any moral principle
to abstain from political discussions",
he felt that there were "the strongest
prudential motives to do so". This was
because, he said, such a jurist "might,
with perfect innocence, in discussing a
political subject elsewhere, express an
opinion which might afterwards cross
his judicial path whilst on the Bench,
place him in a delicate situation, and
in the public estimation cast a blot
upon the sacred ermine". 16
By the mid-1840s, American politics
was in another of the stages of disintegration that had prevented the coalescing of a two-party system since the
opening of the century. The Presidential
campaign of 1840, in fact, had been an
exercise in irrationality. The Whigs,
themselves a coalition of the remnants
of earlier factions rather than an organized party, sought a candidate who,
because he had the fewest known political principles, would displease the
fewest number of voters. They found
their man in William Henry Harrison
of Ohio and filled out the ticket with
John Tyler of Virginia, a vigorous
states' rights spokesman who stood for
most things the Whig leaders were
against. The incongruity of the situation was glossed over by deliberately
avoiding the adoption of any platform,
launching an all-out campaign of abuse
against the Democrat, Van Buren, and
evading a discussion of the issues by
resort to the campaign song of Tippecanoe and Tyler Too.
The Whigs won the election, but

within a month lost the fruits of victory. The elderly Harrison contracted
pneumonia on the day of his inaugural
and died on April 4. For the first time
in national history a Vice President
moved into the White House. At once,
Tyler made it clear that he expected to
restore government to the low-keyed
style it had enjoyed under the Democratic Republicans of the Jeffersonian
age. Feeling betrayed, the Whigs in
Congress promptly repudiated the administration and rallied around their
old leader, Henry Clay, a longtime
Tyler foe. That fall, all but one of the
President's Cabinet resigned over a bitterly disputed banking bill. In 1842 the
Whigs lost control of the House of
Representatives. With the Clay forces
in control of the Senate and the Democrats in the majority in the House,
Tyler became a President without a
party.
Tyler Fails to Nominate
in Five Attempts
It was against this chaotic background that Tyler's half dozen Supreme Court nominations were attempted. In December of 1843 Justice
Smith Thompson died, and the following month Tyler sent to the Senate the
name of John C. Spencer of New York
to fill the vacancy. Spencer was a
widely known attorney, but his name
was anathema to the Clay Whigs. Once
be had been a leader of an anti-Clay
faction in the party, and the anti-Tyler
forces in the Senate poured an avalanche of invective on him. Because he
once had opposed Tyler but then had
accepted appointments to both the War
and Treasury Departments in the Tyler
Cabinet, Spencer also was denounced
as an opportunist and a turncoat. His
confirmation, declared Clay's lieutenant, Senator Crittenden, "would have
been a plain violation of all public po17
litical morality".
Even so, Spencer's nomination was
rejected by a narrow margin-21 to
26. It was the closest to success of five
13. S. ExEc. JOUR., February 13, 1811.
14. 1 WARREN, supra note 9, at 702-704.
15. 5 CONG. DEB. 81 (1829).
16. 2 WARREN, supra note 9, at 41.

17. Id. at 111.
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different nominations Tyler sent to the
Capitol. The President appears to have
sought earnestly for able candidates,
but he was caught in an impossible situation, lacking even a minority administration group in the Senate to organize possible support for any of his
nominations. His second nominee was,
in professional prestige, even more
highly qualified than Spencer-but,
unhappily, he also was more highly
vulnerable to political retribution. He
was Reuben H. Walworth, chancellor of
New York state, whom Thurlow Weed,
New York political boss, promptly dismissed as "querulous, disagreeable,
[and] unpopular".
It was a signal for the Clay Whigs in
the Senate to revive their planned campaign of denigration; and now, as if to
compound Tyler's troubles, a second
vacancy opened on the Court with the
death of Justice Henry Baldwin in the
spring of 1844. With Presidential nominating conventions and election campaigns in the offing, the Whigs and
Democrats alike, each confident of victory and in any case confident of getting rid of the President, acquiesced in
a postponement of action on the nominations. "Better the Bench shall be vacant for a year, than filled for half a
century by . . . partisans committed in
advance to particular beliefs", said the
National Intelligencer.1s
The Tyler nominations of Walworth
and Judge Edward King of Philadelphia were tabled by the Senate on June
15, 1844, and the parties turned their
attention to the Presidential campaigns. The election of Democratic
James K. Polk rang down the final curtain on Henry Clay's persistent efforts
to get into the White House. It also left
the Whigs in the Senate with a choice
between confirming the Court nominations of a Whig President, even one
they had repudiated, or leaving both
positions to be filled by the Democrats,
who would control the new Congress.
In an attempt at conciliation, Tyler
early in 1845 withdrew the Walworth
and King nominations-after a vain
second effort to get King's name approved-and substituted two other
nominees. One--Chief Justice Samuel
Nelson of New York-was so conspicu-
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ously competent (and nonpolitical)
that the Senate at last co-operated and
confirmed him. It was to be Tyler's
only success in six tries. His other
nominee, John M. Read of Philadelphia, a former United States district
attorney, appeared to have no political
opposition, but neither did he have any
strong political support. The old Congress adjourned without taking any action on him.

Justice's Seat Vacant
for Eighteen Months
Justice Baldwin's seat continued unoccupied well into the administration
of President Polk. By the time Congress convened in December of 1845,
the position had been vacant for eighteen months. Polk, like Tyler, felt obliged to find a candidate from Pennsylvania, but now he was caught in a
cross-current of state political rivalries.
Polk's first thought was to nominate
his Secretary of State, James Buchanan, but the future President vacillated
continually. Like many another lawyer
in politics, Buchanan was torn between
a professional desire for the high judicial office and an unsatisfied appetite
for equally high political office.
In Buchanan's place, after receiving
much contradictory
advice, Polk
finally nominated George W. Woodward, a judge of a minor state court in
Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, the President had failed to clear the nomination
with the two Pennsylvania Senators,
and one of them, Simon Cameron,
found Woodward's candidacy "obnoxious". Following the already established Senatorial custom of deferring
to such a plea by one of its colleagues,
the Democratic majority rejected the
nomination, 20 to 29.19
The old issue of a retiring President
and a hostile Senate plagued the last
year of Millard Fillmore's administration and resulted in three more frustrated nominations for the Supreme
Court. In the summer of 1852 the
long-ailing Justice John McKinley had
died. It was most inopportune, for the
Whigs in the Senate, who might have
been expected to unite on one of their
own party to replace the late Democratic incumbent, were on the verge of
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their final disintegration. The slavery
issue was mounting in intensity toward
its final crisis, and the occupant of the
White House was once more without
an administration bloc in the Senate.
Slavery Issue Leads to
Split of Whig Party
Fillmore had come to the Presidency
by the accident of Zachary Taylor's
death halfway through his term. He
took office in the midst of the bitter
Senate struggle that produced the Compromise of 1850, a series of legislative
enactments that sought to appease both
the extreme slavery and antislavery
factions in Congress. The most significant result of this wrangle was the split
of the Whigs into factions led by Senator William H. Seward of New York,
who opposed the compromise, and
President Fillmore, who supported it.
Thus, when McKinley died two
years later, there was every political
reason why the Senate should not be
enthusiastic about a Fillmore judicial
appointment. The Whigs' split meant
that the President would not be able to
win nomination for a second term. The
Democrats in the Senate, who held a
fair majority, were confident that the
coming elections would add to their
control and insure confirmation of a
jurist of their own preference recommended by a President of their own
party. Accordingly, when Fillmore sent
up the name of Edward A. Bradford, a
well-known Louisiana lawyer, on August 16, the Senate took no action at
all on the nomination and wound up its
20
business shortly thereafter.
The November, 1852, elections justified all Democratic expectations. The
Whigs collapsed and soon passed into
history, the Presidency went to Franklin Pierce, and the Democratic majority in the Senate rose to thirty-eight
from twenty-two. With this handwriting
on the wall, it was virtually a foregone
conclusion that Congress would give
little consideration to any more Fillmore appointees. Nor were the men he
proposed able to offset their own politi-

18. Quoted in id., at 117.
19. S. ExEc. JoUR., January 22, 1846.
20. S. EXEC. Jout., February 11, 1853.
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cal defects in Democratic eyes. The
first, Senator George E. Badger of
North Carolina, was a nationalist Whig
who struck horror in the hearts of the
states' rights leaders of the majority
party. On February 11, 1853, after a
month of desultory debate, the Senate
voted, 26 to 25, to "postpone" any action on the Supreme Court vacancy
until after March 4.
Fillmore, still pursuing a forlorn
hope, then submitted the name of William C. Micou of Louisiana, a law
partner of Judah P. Benjamin. But by
now it was clear that for this Senate
"advice and consent" was a simple
matter of party lining. Micou's candidacy expired on March 4 without Senate action, and the incoming President
Pierce, within three weeks of taking office, sent up his own nominee, John
Archibald Campbell of Alabama, who
was promptly confirmed.
The story was repeated at the end of
Buchanan's administration in February,
1861. Justice Peter V. Daniel had died
the previous June, and in November
Abraham Lincoln had won in a fourparty campaign for the Presidency.
Now, in February, Southern Senators
were almost daily resigning to follow
their seceding states, and the majority
held by the new Republican Party was
growing by default. Under these circumstances, Buchanan's attempt at filling the Court vacancy was almost ludicrous-he nominated his own Secretary of State, Jeremiah S. Black. Although a competent enough lawyer, it
was fantasy to think that the Senate at
this time would accept the chief Cabinet officer of a discredited and defeated
administration. Horace Greeley's New
York Tribune called the act "a flight of
insolence", and the Senate rejected it
within two weeks, although by a narrow vote, 25 to 26.21
Reconstruction Era Sees
Height of Political Color
The height, or depth, of political coloration of judicial appointments was
to be reached in the Reconstruction
Era. Not only the President, Andrew
Johnson, but the Court itself had by
then become the target of vehement
Senate hatred. Intent upon destroying

the civil governments Johnson had reestablished in the Southern states,
planning in their place a rigid military
control under which restructuring of
the conquered territory would be effected before readmission to the
Union, Congress had serious doubts as
to the Court's reliability in any test of
the constitutionality of its program.
There was also the matter of the trial
being conducted by a military commission in the District of Columbia of the
persons accused of the assassination of
President Lincoln. How would the
Court rule if petitions for habeas corpus were sought by these defendants?
It was rather clear that Chief Justice
Salmon P. Chase was not prepared to
yield an iota of the Court's constitutional independence; he already had
refused to permit any of the Justices to
sit on circuits in any of the Southern
states thereby, among other things,
preventing the trial of Jefferson Davis
for treason) until there was an express
executive order affirming that the judiciary was not subject to the military
authorities therein.
During Lincoln's administration the
Court had been increased to ten Justices, and in May of 1865-one month
after the assassination-a vacancy was
created by the death of Justice Catron.
Harassed from the outset of his administration, Johnson neglected to send up
a nomination to replace Catron until
the following April 16. The timing was
doubly unfortunate; not only had the
President missed the opportunity to
challenge the Radical Republican opposition before it had attained its
strength, but now the nomination came
on the heels of the renowned decision
in Ex pOrte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2
(1866), a case that appeared to forecast a judicial nullification of the Radicals' whole plan of Reconstruction. In
that case the Court held unequivocally
that civilians could not be tried by military courts when, as in the Southern
District of Indiana where Milligan was
tried, civil courts were open.
Milligan rocked a nation still in
deel shock from four years of Civil
War and the murder of its President.
The substantial number of spokesmen
who praised the opinion as a funda-

mental statement of constitutional
rights were shouted down by Radicals
everywhere. President Johnson added
fuel to the flames by promptly applying the principle in Milligan to all
cases in the South where civilians were
awaiting trial by military tribunals.
More incendiary matter was provided
in a report that the Court would soon
hear argument challenging the constitutionality of military government in
the seceded states in general.
Number of Justices
Reduced to Seven
In this inflamed state of public affairs, both Johnson's chance of making
a judicial appointment and the composition of the Court itself became the
victims of Radical vindictiveness.
Without acting on the Catron replacement-Attorney General Henry Stanbery-the Senate turned its attention
to a bill sponsored by Lyman Trumbull
of Illinois, providing that no more appointments to the Court should be
made until the number of Justices
had been reduced to seven.
The crass political motivation of the
Judiciary Act of 186622 was unmistakable; indeed, a spokesman in the
House of Representatives confessed unashamedly that "this bill abolishes the
Judge whose appointment the President sent to the Senate" and that this
was its primary purpose. The Radicals
planned to bring the Court, as well as
the White House, under their control,
and when the unhappy Johnson ended
his term, they gave notice that his successor, Ulysses S. Grant, would fare little better, although be was, in their
view, one of their own.
In 1869 the number of Justices was
changed back to nine. 23 Grant, assuming that he was free to choose a candidate of his own preference, eventually
submitted the name of his Attorney
General, then Ebenezer R. Hoar, and
immediately the worst elements of the
Senate Radicals, who proved to be a
substantial majority, formed a coali-

21. S. ExEc. JOUR., February 16, 1861.
22. Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 110, 14 Stat.
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tion against him. Some argued that the
new chair should go to a nominee from
the "reconstructed" South; others
made no effort to conceal the fact that
they found Hoar objectionable because
he had favored a stronger civil service
system; and the die-hards hated him
for having opposed the proceedings to
impeach Johnson. Eventually, Hoar
24
3
was rejected by a 24-to-3 vote.
Congress Demands
Nomination of Stanton
Even clearer evidence of the Radicals' arrogance developed when, soon
after Hoar's nomination, another vacancy developed with the retirement of
Justice Robert C. Grier, which was
dated to take effect February 1, 1870.
A substantial majority of the members
of both Houses of Congress drew up a
petition and sent it to Grant, demanding the appointment of the former Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton. An
arrogant opportunist who as a Cabinet
member had intrigued with the Radicals against Johnson and who brazenly
refused to resign when at last the harassed President dismissed him, Stanton
was the very prototype of the men the
Radicals wanted to see on the Court. In
1867 he had had the effrontry to dictate a section of the Military Appropriation Act of 1867 requiring that the
President issue all military orders
through the Secretary of War and that
any other military commands of the
Commander in Chief should be null.
From February, to May, 1868, when
Johnson's impeachment failed, Stanton
had barricaded his office and refused
to permit access to War Department
records. Only when the prospect of
ousting the President vanished did
Stanton grudgingly give up his resistance.
Grant, hoping to appease the Radicals and preserve Hoar's candidacy,
yielded to the pressure and formally
nominated Stanton for Grier's position
on December 20, 1869. The nomination was confirmed the same day it was
received by the Senate. The legality of
nominating, not to mention confirming, a candidate for a position that
would not be vacant for another six
weeks was not debated. The dubious
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taste and status of that action, as well
as the question of what the Court
might have become with the addition
of a rancorous and domineering politician, were never to be determined.
Four days after the confirmation, Stanton died.
On February 7, 1870-four days
after Hoar's rejection-the Court
handed down a five-to-three opinion in
the first Legal Tender Case (Hepburn
v. Griswold), 8 Wall. 603 (1870),
holding the wartime greenback law, as
it applied to prior contracts stipulating
specie payment, to be unconstitutional.
On the same day Grant sent two new
names to the Senate for the vacancies
on the bench-William Strong of
Pennsylvania and Joseph P. Bradley of
New Jersey. Almost from that date
there developed the story that the nominations were intended to "pack" the
Court and provide two more votes for
the Hepburn minority of three, since
Grier, one of the original majority,
now had retired. From the circumstances of the nominations, it seems
unlikely that the administration had
given this possibility any thought. On
the other hand, it was well known both
in the White House and on Capitol Hill
that both men favored the argument
that the greenback statute was valid.
Strong was confirmed on February
18, but Bradley's nomination was held
up until March 21, when it was approved, 46 to 9. Neither man had strong
political persuasions that enabled Radicals in the Senate to focus opposition
against him, although neither was considered to be a Radical sympathizer.
In any event, since the majority of the
financial community and their men in
Congress were hoping for a rehearing
of the legal tender issue before a full
Court, the choices seemed to be vindicated when, on March 25, Attorney
General Hoar moved the Court to hear
argument on two new legal tender
cases, and the Court granted the motion on April 1. When, a year later, a
five-to-four majority reversed Hepburn, with Strong and Bradley joining
the majority opinion, the presumed
"packing" appeared to have served its
25
purpose.
In May of 1873 Chief Justice Chase
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died. Six months later Grant bestirred
himself on the matter of a replacement.
Apparently he was intent on finding a
political crony to place in the position,
for he approached three of his closest
advisers in succession to offer them the
post. The first, Senator Roscoe Conkling of New York, declined. Grant then
sent up the name of his current Attorney General, George H. Williams of
Oregon. It was, in the view of many
public and professional spokesmen, the
worst selection since Madison's choice
of Alexander Wolcott sixty years before.
A party wheelhorse who had voted
"guilty" at Andrew Johnson's trial,
Williams consistently showed up to
handle some of the Radicals' most noxious assignments. In 1876 he would be
one of a special task force sent to Florida by the Republican National Committee "to save the state for Hayes"-a
job he was able to carry off. Now, although the public outcry did not deter
the Senate Judiciary Committee from
first reporting out Williams's nomination favorably, its report was called
back when it received subsequent evidence that the Attorney General had
removed a United States district attorney in Portland to halt the investigation of Oregon voting frauds that purportedly implicated Williams's colleague, Senator John H. Mitchell.
When, on the heels of this disclosure,
the New York Bar Association formally condemned the nomination,
Grant reluctantly withdrew Williams's
name.

Cushing's Name Withdrawn
on Charge of Disloyalty
Two days later, on January 10,
1874, the President sent up another selection-Caleb Cushing of Massachusetts. An even more bizarre fate was in
store for this candidacy. While much
was made of Cushing's political instability-he had been over the past
twenty years a Clay Whig, then a Tyler
man, a Democrat, then a confidante of
Andrew Johnson and finally a regular

24. S. ExEc. JOUR., February 3, 1870.

25. Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, 12
Wall. 457 (1871).

"Advice and Consent"
Republican-none of these charges
seemed likely to weigh heavily against
his nomination. But then, fortuitously,
someone turned up from some old Confederate documents a letter that Cushing had written in 1861 to Jefferson
Davis as President of the Confederacy.
While the letter was wholly nonpolitical, it was a made-to-order excuse for a
suggestion of disloyalty. Three days
after he had submitted Cushing's
name, the President in considerable
embarrassment was compelled to withdraw it.
Struggles between the White House
and the Senate were to aggravate the
process of judicial nomination and
confirmation on three more occasions
in the '80s and '90s. The first of these
revolved about Chester A. Arthurlike Tyler and Fillmore in earlier eras,
an accidental successor to the chief executive's position by the fact of a Presidential death. In the last months of
Rutherford B. Hayes's administration,
Roscoe Conkling and the White House
had engaged in a violent dispute over
Hayes's proposal to extend the United
States Civil Service to a number of
government positions in New York.
Conkling regarded this as an attempt
to undermine his political machine in
that state, and he fought the plan.
Hayes retaliated by removing one of
Conkling's lieutenants-Arthur-from
the lucrative post of Collector of Customs of the Post of New York. The result of this vendetta was to split the
Republican Party into two warring factions on the eve of the Presidential
campaign of 1880.
In what they considered a masterful
compromise-but reminiscent of the
action of the Whigs of 1840-the Republican Party managers selected a
Hayes man, James A. Garfield, as the
nominee for President, and balanced
him with Arthur himself as nominee
for Vice President. Thus, when Garfield was assassinated, Arthur found
himself in a position uncomfortably
similar to Tyler's in 1842 and Fillmore's in 1850, with his party support
in Congress largely in doubt. It was at
this juncture that Justice Ward Hunt
resigned from the Court, and Arthur
determined to make the choice of his

successor a test of party strength and
discipline.
The issue was made unmistakably
clear in the selection of the nominee,
Roscoe Conkling himself, who had just
lost his control over the New York Republican machine and had retired from
the Senate. On March 2, 1882, the final
vote on Conkling's candidacy was
taken and carried by a margin of 39 to
21. Having accomplished his purpose,
Arthur was not particularly surprised
or disappointed when Conkling formally declined the appointment.
Control of New York Machine
Essential to Both Parties
Control of the party machinery in
New York was as fundamental to Democratic as to Republican administrations, and this led to the final two rejections of Supreme Court nominations
in the nineteenth century as casualties
in the power struggle between Grover
Cleveland and Senator David B. Hill of
New York. In effect, Hill fought
against the first nomination because
the nominee had ruled against one of
Hill's henchmen, but both Hill and
Senator Edward Murphy opposed the
second nominee because he was too independent of the party in any event.
In July, 1893, Justice Samuel Blatchford died, and that fall Cleveland sent
up the name of William Hornblower to
be his successor. Hornblower was a
circumspect New York lawyer, but as
an election commissioner he had ruled
against one of Hill's men, and the Senator found this sufficient reason to invoke the hoary rule of "Senatorial
courtesy" by pronouncing the nominee
obnoxious to him. Being rebuffed in
this attempt, Cleveland then selected a
man even more highly regarded in
New York-Wheeler H. Peckham,
whose brother, Rufus, would in fact be
confirmed for the Court the following
year. Peckham had made his popular
reputation by serving as special counsel in the prosecution of Boss Tweed in
1863, and his professional eminence
was exemplified in his role as a
founder of The Association of the Bar
of the City of New York. But with this
high professional competence went a
political independence that both New

York Senators found obnoxious, especially when coupled with their antipathy for Cleveland. Wheeler also was rejected.
Having twice been repulsed by his
New York adversaries in the Senate,
Cleveland concluded that he would
have to turn to a nominee from some
other state. At the same time, he had
reason to assume that the Hill faction
would continue to oppose him effectively unless he could turn its own tactics against it. This led to his third and
final choice, a member of the very Sen.
ate in which "collegial courtesy"
played such a fundamental role. Edward Douglass White of Louisiana had
many political attributes in his favor
-he was a Confederate veteran, a
Roman Catholic and a Democrat; he
would be a popular selection for the
Southern wing of the party, which had
enjoyed only a short-lived accommodation in the prior selection of Lucius Q.
C. Lamar of Mississippi in 1888,
Lamar having died within five years of
ascending the bench. As a freshman
Senator, White would hardly be opposed by the New York Democrats, especially with the Southern members of
the party expected to unite behind him.
Cleveland's strategy paid off, and the
final nineteenth century struggle over
the politics of "advice and consent"
was settled quickly.
Twentieth Century History
Lists Fewer Rejections
The nineteenth century witnessed at
least one Senate rejection of a Supreme
Court nominee in nine of its ten decades. While the twentieth century had
only five instances in its first seventy
years, this is not to suggest that politics has become an inert ingredient in
the matter of judicial selection. The
prolonged and obfuscating debate on
the nomination of Louis D. Brandeis
in 1916, with a 47-to-22 vote on confirmation being qualified by the abstention of twenty-seven other Senators, is perhaps the most blatant in26
stance of ideological contentiousness.
Chief Justice William Howard Taft's
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active lobbying to secure a conservative majority on the Court through the
confirmation of Pierce Butler is now
well documented.2 7 The considerations
that led to the first New Deal appointments were highlighted in the great
"court-packing" struggle of 1937.28
And President Richard M. Nixon has
been candid in declaring that he intends
to seek appointees who will tend to
dampen down the volatility developed
on the Court during the Warren
29
years.
The rejection of Judge John J.
Parker in 1930 was somewhat distinguishable from typical nineteenth century Senate rejections in that the Sen.
ate, which for most of the past decade
had been frustrated by the adamant
commitment of the Court's majority to
a laissez-/aire philosophy, was taking
this means of expressing its dissatisfaction with the course of constitutional
doctrine. After the flurry of appointments to the Court following Taft's
accession as Chief Justice-George
Sutherland, Pierce Butler and Edward
T. Sanford within five months of each
other-almost a decade had passed in
which Harlan F. Stone was the only
additional appointee. In the course of
this decade of "normalcy", the reform-minded minority of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Brandeis and Stone vainly
spoke for the legislative efforts of state
and national governments to deal effectively with the corporate economy, accelerating urbanization and changing
social issues. 30 Against them were
aligned the phalanx of conservativesSutherland, Butler, Willis Van Devanter, James McReynolds, Taft and
"Taft's automatic second vote", Sanford.
It was not, then, Parker himself so
much as the philosophy of the Court
majority at which the reformers in
Congress directed their attack when
Herbert Hoover sent that ill-starred
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nomination to the Senate. Hoover's
earlier choice of Charles Evans Hughes
had stirred up some protest votes, but
the impeccable character and professional competence of the man made it
impractical to consider a serious attempt to reject him. With Parker, character and competence were not in
issue; his vulnerability lay in a record
that his critics-who were more directly concerned with criticism of the
Court's jurisprudence-could magnify
as antilabor and anti-Negro. That considerations such as these were the
touchstones of midtwentieth century
economic orthodoxy was demonstrated
nearly four decades later when Judge
Haynsworth was confronted with simi31
lar criticisms.

What Should the Senate's
Role Be in Judicial Selection?
If the politics of "advice and consent" tends to shock a pristine sense of
innocence, it nevertheless serves to emphasize that the American ideal of
check-and-balance government is implemented in the realities of human
passions and prejudices. What, in the
final analysis, is the role of Congress,
and particularly the Senate, in the
process of judicial selection? And how
may it be carried out in practice except by individuals and groups who
have their own view of the qualities
they seek in an appointee?
Granted, what the Senate majority
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may be seeking at any given point in
national history may be irrelevant as a
contribution to effective
Supreme
Court jurisprudence. The identity of
the particular nominee may be all but
lost in the course of the debate on his
confirmation, which may be directed at
the personality or policies of the President or the Court. Even when Senate
inquiry focuses on the nominee's qualifications, moreover, they are evaluated
subjectively in terms of each individual
Senator's concept of the constitutional
function of the Court.
When the President selects adequately qualified men as his nominees,
the political considerations that are a
part of the selection and Senate confirmation or rejection are not likely to
have an adverse effect on the appointee's performance. Good jurists who
are rejected for political reasons are,
of course, a loss to the nation; the real
injury, however, arises when a Stanton
is foisted upon the country with little
to recommend him except that he is the
front man for a claque.
To estimate how many "good" and
"bad" candidates have been either confirmed or rejected in the process of
"advice and consent" over 180 years is
beyond the scope of this short review.
The point of the present study is to recall that the process of confirmation
or rejection is unavoidably, perennially-and, perhaps, logically-a part of
the American political system.
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